Im p e r ia l C o l l e g e [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] In October 1927 Penney entered the Mathematics course at the Royal College o f Science as a Royal Scholar, having been granted exemption both from the external examination and the first year of the course. He won the Governor's Prize for Mathematics and obtained First Class Honours in 1929, scoring 100% in his final year, but a few errors in the first year brought his overall average down to 98%. He worked hard, and did not play a prominent part in university life, but he was well liked by his contemporaries. He roomed with four other students. He played soccer for the RCS team, and 'proved a robust, bustling centre-forward of the old fashioned type, with a powerful shot. ' He then took a graduate course at RCS on 'Perturbation of Band Spectra'. After spending the first term in Holland at the University of Groningen he served as a part-time demonstrator. In 1931 he was awarded a Ph.D. and the Diploma of Imperial College. About this time he taught himself French in a few months with very little help. 'As a young man', he told his sons, 'I had a phenomenal memory. ' In 1931 too he secured a Commonwealth Fund Fellowship and went for two years to the University of Wisconsin when he worked with J.R. Van Vleck and took an MA degree. Van Vleck wrote 'He has an unusual gift for absorbing new developments in theoretical physics very rapidly and is a hard and persistent worker.' He was very happy in Wisconsin and made many good American friends, for from the outset he got on very well with Americans. He had absolutely no side or stand-offishness and his unaffectedness and simple approach to life appealed greatly to them.
On his return he won an 1851 Exhibition Senior Studentship and held it at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he took a Ph.D. His supervisor reported on him as 'a mathematical physicist of great power and versatility. His main subjects have been the application of quantum mechanics to the physics of crystals. His papers represent a remarkable output for h is y e a rs .In 1935 he had also taken a D.Sc. at the University of London. In 1936he became for a short time Stokes Student at Pembroke College, Cambridge, but soon moved back to Imperial College as Assistant Professor and Reader in Mathematics, a post which he held nominally until 1945. According to a student who attended some of his lectures, he was first class on the subjects in which he had a direct personal interest, but rather woolly on other parts of the course.5 Dr L.L. Ware, who attended Penney's course of lectures on quantum mechanics, remembers that Penney used to construct mental models of organic compounds by bringing various atoms from infinite distances to a carbon atom to form an organic molecule.
He would then ask me, an organic chemist, whether such a compound existed and whther it had certain properties. Thus he, as a mathematician, was able to predict the structure and properties of substances which were already known to chemists. Another example of his mathematical methods in organic chemistry was his showing why it was not possible to separate the so-called 'boat-shaped' and 'armchair-shaped' forms of the structure of cyclohexane. He proved that the kinetic energy of ordinary molecular movement was more than the difference of energies of each structure. This example was one given to me to check when I was doing some research with him.
I am indebted to Professor D.M. Edwards of Imperial College for the following assessment of his work in this period.
Penney's early scientific work, in the 1930s, was concerned with the application of quantum mechanics to fundamental problems in the theory of solids and to the theory of the chemical bond. His first paper, with R. de L. Kronig, is perhaps his best known one. The Kronig and Penney model is an exactly soluble one-dimensional model for the quantum states of an electron in a crystal. It provided an explicit calculation of electronic energy bonds, separated by energy gaps, and variants of the model are still widely used, particularly in connection with quantum well structures used in semiconductor devices. Penney's second paper was on the photoelectric effect in this metallic film and his approach is more in tune with recent developments than other work at the time which concentrated almost entirely on the contribution of surface states to the photocurrent. Penney's third paper (1932) , on the polarization of light emitted from an atom excited by electron collision, was again a remarkably detailed and accurate application of quantum mechanical theory, itself only a few years old. Following preliminary work by Oppenheimer, Penney showed that it was necessary to allow not only for electron and the fine structure of atomic states but also for nuclear spin and hyperfine structure. No improvement was made on the Oppenheimer-Penny theory until the work of Percival and Seaton in 1958.
Undoubtedly Penney's most important work in solid state physics is the group of papers , published with Schlapp and Van Vleck, on the magnetic susceptibilities of paramagnetic ions in crystals. In his famous book of 1932, Van Vleck discussed the effect of the crystalline electric field qualitatively but in the same year Schlapp and Penney gave the first quantitative discussion with application to salts of praseodymium and neodymium.
In the later 1930s Penney's interest turned to the theory of the chemical bond and in 1935 his short monograph 'The quantum theory of valency' was published. Together with Sutherland he showed how in the hydrogen peroxide molecule I^0 2 it is energetically favourable to twist one half of the molecule around the 0 -0 bond through rather more than 90° with respect to the other half. Subsequently he made an important contribution to the theory of the ethylene double bond and to the theory of resonance bonding developed by Pauling.
Penney's work in solid state physics and quantum chemistry is characterized by detailed calcula tions, based on realistic physical assumptions, leading to firm and lasting conclusions. W a r s e r v ic e [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] When war came Penney registered for work on 'Mathematical Physics' but at first continued to teach at Imperial College. In 1940 he was called up by the Ministry of Home Security, where he worked on the blast effects of bombing, and then transferred to the A dm ira lty to investigate problems connected with the nature and properties of blast waves and the design of Mulberry Harbours. From the outset of his work in Government he revealed the gift of getting on well with the armed services, and an outstanding capacity to explain complicated scientific problems to laymen in terms which they could understand.
In 1944, after the Quebec Agreement had restored British collaboration with the United States on the development of the atomic bomb, Penney was appointed, on the insistence of G.I. Taylor, a Principal Scientific Officer in the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and sent, over the protests of Imperial College and the Admiralty, to the Los Alamos Laboratory as a member of the British team. There he worked mainly on use of the weapon, its effects and their measurement.6 His calculations eventually proved vital in determining the height of detonation of the two Japanese bombs.7 He spent half his time working on the scientific phenomena going inwards into the bomb and the other half on the scientific phenomena going outwards.8 Equally vital was Penney's role as a member of the committee which advised on the selection of the target in Japan. The scientific studies which Penney himself made probably determined the decision.^ Through his unaffected and straightforward approach as well as his scientific talent, he won the respect and admiration of his American colleagues in Los Alamos and in addition to his technical contributions he acquired a considerable influence on policy. General Groves, the autocratic Director of the Manhattan Project, was a hard man to satisfy. But he intervened when there was a possibility that Penney might leave Los Alamos and take a Chair at Oxford, and he records in his memoirs that 'Throughout the life of the project vital decisions were resolved only after discussion with the men I thought were able to offer the soundest advice. Generally. . . they were Oppenheimer, von Neumann, Penney (and two others)'10 There could be no greater testimony to Penney's position and influence. An American colleague wrote in 1949 T o r the work of the Theoretical Division of Los Alamos the collaboration of the British Mission was absolutely essential.'11 Penney's own 'intuitive assessment' of the British contribution to the work was more modest: 'around 10% '12 In 1945 Penney was sent to the US Air Force base on the Pacific island of Tinian to observe the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. There he was joined by the then Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC who records 'My billet was simple, but this I shared with Bill Penney. He looked physically fit and strong, was quietly welcoming and I immediately felt at home. '13 The American Air Force High Command resented the presence of the British observers and disregarded their orders to include diem in the first flight to Hiroshima. Resourcefully they sent a telegram of protest to Field Marshal Wilson in Washington, and were reluctantly included in the Nagasaki mission at the last minute. Although their pilot lost contact with the leading plane, they arrived just in time to witness the drop. Afterwards, records Cheshire, 'I wriggled my way down to join Bill in the central compartment; he startled me by saying "that is only the detonator compared with the bomb that is to come."' 4 Shortly thereafter Penney was sent with two American colleagues to investigate the blast effects of the Hiroshima bomb. Here his skill in finding simple solutions to complex problems was demonstrated. Among other things, he noticed the effects of the blast on petrol cans. Even after years of study and research, Penney's original estimate of the yield of the explosion has not been seriously challenged. Penney's reputation with the Americans continued to rise. They were anxious to employ him , and even after the passage of the 1946 MacMahon Act, which ended the wartime collaboration between the two countries, they included him in Operation Crossroads, the atomic weapon tests at Bikini. There, owing to an aiming error, the sophisticated American equipment for measuring blast effects failed to function properly. Penney had distributed petrol cans and oil drums around the site, and they proved effective in giving the information required.
I am indebted to Professor J.S. Stuart, F.R.S., head of the Mathematics Department at Imperial College, for the following assessment of Penney's scientific work between 1940 and 1945.
Some of William Penney* s later researches arise from his activities during World War n and later, there being the two particular stimuli of (i) nuclear explosions and their effects and (ii) water-wave interactions associated with the Mulberry Harbour operations off Normandy in 1944.
(i) In the immediate aftermath of the nuclear explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Penney was a leading member of a team charged with assessing the 'yield' of these two nuclear bombs. A detailed scientific paper was published by Penney, Samuels and Scorgie (1970),15 where it is made clear that a major reason for this investigation lay in the need for accurate interpretation and correlation of medical and biological data. Much later (in 1983) Penney was involved again with a reassessment of the 1945 explosions and had correspondence with Dr EUett of the American-Japanese committee dealing with injury claims among survivors; an unpublished paper is recorded as Penney (1981) . 16 What is abundantly apparent from these two papers is the clear perception by Penney of the way in which damage to various everyday objects could be used to estimate the explosive intensity of yield. Thus attention was paid to flash bums on telegraph poles, to the bending of cylindrical flagpoles, to the collapse of empty oil cans and to the overturning of memorial stones near temples. Specimens were shipped to the UK for testing; more particularly the investigations were supported by the testing of models (for example, in wind tunnels and shock tubes) and by mathematical calculations. Estimates of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki yields are given in the 1970 paper.
An impressive aspect of the later paper (1981) is the clarity which Penney was able to bring to bear to a reassessment at the age of 72 and so many years after die event (for example, to quote William Penney in a letter of 8 September to Dr Ellett: T also remember clearly that the bombardier also said . . . ', Much detail follows!)
(ii) Large explosions, especially nuclear explosions, can cause atmospheric gravity waves to arise and propagate. Having been generated by a source which is localized in space and time, the atmospheric waves are analogous to those which have been recorded from natural phenomena (Krakatoa 1883 and the Siberian meteorite 1908). But the topic gained in importance in the 1950s in connection with the detection and agreed control of nuclear testing, and the paper of Hunt, Palmer and Penney (I960)17 arose from this need.
Thus Hunt et al. consider gravity waves generated in several different model atmospheres. find two types of travelling wave, in one of which the kinetic energy per unit volume tends to zero at great heights, while in the other it remains finite. Thus an explosion at ground level produces a pulse in two parts, including (a) a wave train observable at ground level at great distances and (b) a wave train which disappears into the upper atmosphere. One significant conclusion is that the Siberian meteorite is likely to have been of magnitude 10 ± MT, close in energy to the largest man-made nuclear explosions.
(iii) Underwater nuclear explosions produce what is called a 'base-surge', this being a vertical column of an air-water mixture which then collapses. Part HI of the paper by Martin, Moyce, Penney, Price and Thornhill (1952)18 is by Penney and Thornhill and is a theoretical study of a model problem in which a heavy fluid column collapses under its own weight while immersed in a lighter fluid (Parts IV and V are experimental studies by Martin and Moyce of the same topic). Penney and Thornhill use potential theory for each of the fluids and calculate the evolution of the interface. It is known that the angle, of contact at the base of the interface between the two fluids is usually {Ji/3 } for a steady advance. But this was not found; rather the angle remained {x/2} for two fluids, but tended to zero at large times when the light fluid was replaced by a vacuum. More work is needed on this topic, theoretically and experimentally, although there has been important activity since 1952.
(iv) The Mulberry artificial harbour played a significant part in the Allied landings in Normandy in June 1944, but scientific and technological problems of design and operation emerged beforehand. Parts I and II (both by W.G. Penney and A.T. Price) of Martin et (1952) are concerned with water-wave problems arising from that time. (The General Introduction by Penney to that paper gives much valuable background information.)
Part I treats the diffraction of water waves around the end of a long straight breakwater, a topic which, as Penney and Price noted, is equivalent to the classical Sommerfeld diffraction problem for light waves. Patterns of water-wave height and phase were obtained for different interactions.
In Part n, Penney and Price discussed finite-amplitude periodic stationary gravity waves in water, and their interaction with structures. A fascinating conjecture, which they put forward, is that the crest of a wave at maximum height has a right-angled nodal form. Their theoretical arguments are persuasive, but not rigorously proven. More work is required on this interesting problem, which Penney and Price posed so clearly. M a r r ia g e a n d fa m il y
In 1935 Bill married Adele Minnie Elms, a very pretty and charming university student from Kent.19 They had two sons, but sadly she never recovered from post-natal depression after the birth of the second son, and she died in April 1945, while Bill was in Los Alamos. He returned only briefly and arranged for Joan Quennell, who had nursed the younger son, to look after the two boys. She took diem to Wales, and on his return in September 1945, Bill married her.
His second marriage coincided with the turning point in his career. He wanted to return to academic life and was offered a Chair in Mathematics at Oxford. But he was prevailed upon to stay on temporarily in Government Service, at least until he could pass on the experience he had acquired in the United States. As Lord Cherwell later wrote 'He is our chief -indeed our only -real expert of the construction of the bomb and I do not know what we should do without him.', and Penney himself said 'It was all in our heads. There was nothing in writing'. Bill and Joan and his two sons went to live in Norwood, where they stayed until they moved to Aldermaston. Joan gave Bill invaluable support, especially at Aldermaston and Imperial College, where her sympathetic interest in the welfare of the staff at both places, and of the students at Imperial College, endeared her to all.
British atomic weapons: Fort Halstead and Aldermaston 1946-1960
The fission bombs Penney abandoned his academic ambitions and accepted in 1946, probably with a heavy heart, the appointment of Chief Superintendent of Armaments Research under the Ministry of Supply, based at Fort Halstead. His first task was that of motivating the staff at the establishment, where morale had fallen to a low level, and to adapt the organization to post-war needs. Early in April 1947, the Attlee Government decided to develop a British atomic bomb and entrusted the task to Lord Portal, the Controller of Atomic Energy at the Ministry of Supply. In May Portal asked Penney to head up a team and work out a programme for this purpose. Penney, like Leonard Cheshire, had concluded after Hiroshima that the possession of atomic weapons was the surest way to keep the peace, and threw himself into the task. He drew up a plan, in long-hand, and submitted a list of requirements.20
Promised high priority, he asked for men, materials and for a fence at Woolwich; he later said that all he got was the fence.21 A special secret section was set up at Fort Halstead in Kent to do the work. But in a period of desperately short supplies of all kinds it was an uphill task, even with the highest priority. Penney's main problem was to find the key people he needed. Almost all the scientists involved in Los Alamos or elsewhere in the US project had dispersed; there was little enthusiasm for joining a top secret establishment; and it was necessary to train those who did join. The delivery of materials and parts needed for the weapons was a constant anxiety. 22 Penney had had no experience of running a large department, and did not care for administration as such. Someone once enquired about the organization at Aldermaston. 'Oh, at Aldermaston', was the reply, 'there are 5000 people helping Bill Penney. ' But in practice Penney was very good at delegating, getting things done, and meeting deadlines. He was assisted on the administrative side by Admiral P. Brooking, a tough and able retired naval officer; and at Fort Halstead he had in 1949 recruited leuan Maddock (afterwards Sir Ieuan Maddock, F.R.S.) who became responsible for instrumentation.
The H-bomb
Penney had wanted the Government to start work on high-yield weapons at the outset, but the Government, advised by Cherwell, decided that the resources for this could not be found. By 1952, however, the development of the fission weapon was on course, and the testing of thermonuclear devices by the USSR and the USA led to a reversal of this policy. A decision to go ahead with development was taken at the end of 1954 and announced in February 1955. This decision placed a further onerous task on Penney's team at Aldermaston. Some relief came in 1954. In September he was joined by Bill (afterwards Sir William) Cook, as Deputy Director. Already an F.R.S., Cook came from the Ministry of Defence as Deputy Director, a driving administrator with a sharp eye for detail. The two got on well together, and divided the work. In Penney's words 'Cook took day to day control of the programme while I maintained a strong, continuing interest in its direction.' The task was first, die preparation of the first fission bomb for testing; second, the development of smaller, more efficient fission bomb; and third, after Cook arrived, the development and testing of the fusion bomb, for which Bill Cook took prime responsibility.
In 1952 Penney was offered an important Chair at Oxford. He wanted to take it, but was dissuaded once more in the national interest. By this time he had developed, first at Fort Halstead and then from 1951 at Aldermaston, great leadership qualities. He inspired confidence and affection. Unstuffy and approachable -he was in the habit of informally dropping in on the different groups and sections of the establishment and discussing the current problems. He tended to concentrate on the work directly connected to his main interests, and some groups would have liked to see more of him. But he was a popular figure, and most of his staff would do almost anything for him. Two anecdotes are current about Penney's methods of work at different levels. One morning, impatient to get to work, Penney borrowed his wife's bicycle and pedalled to the establishment. A guard called out 'Who do you think you are? The gaffer?' 'Yes, I'm the gaffer' was the reply.
When he was pondering die design of the fusion bomb Penney called in Bill Cook. 'The Americans' he said 'claim they have made a fusion bomb and I believe them. But on my present knowledge I cannot design it. There is a fault somewhere. Get our cross-section of the light elements checked for me. ' This was done, and the cross-sections of the lithium was found to be incorrect. Penney relaxed. 'Now I can do it.' he said.25 T e s t in g t h e w e a p o n s Penney had foreseen from the outset the need for testing the weapon, either at the American facilities in Nevada or die Pacific, or at some other remote site. A request was made to the US Government in 1949, but was refused on account of the McMahon Act. Penney then held discussions with the Canadians with an indefinite result. A site for a UK-only test was finally found in the Monte Bello Islands off the north-west coast of Australia. Penney recommended this as the only site available for a test by the desired date.
He had already recruited H.C. Tyte and C.A. Adams to plan the test programme, and preparations were set in hand. The Americans then came up with an offer of their Nevada facility on very restricted conditions. Penney would have preferred to accept this, feeling sure he could work satisfactorily with his American colleagues, but Churchill, advised by Cherwell, decided, largely for political and prestige reasons, to go it alone. The Menzies Government in Australia readily consented, and a naval task force was formed under a Rear Admiral to support the test, which was of an atomic device, detonated in shallow water and designed to prove the operational weapon for the RAF. The Prime Minister became very excited over it. He set up a top level committee to oversee the execution of what in naval terms was a rather small affair, and wasted a lot of time. The Committee was finally brought to an end by Penney, who, when pressed for his views, replied in his slow drawling voice 'Well Prime Minister, I don't think there's anything more to say.' The Committee never met again. The expedition, code named H u r r i c a n e, was not a happy one; the navy an did not get on, there were many technical and logistical difficulties, and morale was rather low. But when Penney flew out and took over, his gifts of leadership rallied the team, and the actual operation was a complete success. The PM was delighted, though I suspect that the tale that he had two telegrams prepared, one beginning 'Thank you Dr Penney' and the other 'Well done Sir William' may be ben trovato. . .
Further tests, requiring a launch site on land, were soon needed. Penney visited Australia and chose a site at Emu Field in South Australia. A series of tests (TOTEM) were held there but its remoteness created many difficulties, and Penney selected a more accessible site at Maralinga. Before it could be made ready, the decision to develop a British fusion weapon required some scientific information urgently and in May 1956 two tests for this purpose (MOSAIC) were carried out by a second ship-supported operation at Monte Bello. Maralinga was operationally ready by September for a further series of tests (BUFFALO). The TOTEM and BUFFALO series were personally directed by Penney. He later wrote 'Following the first Russian explosion in 1949 . . . it became necessary to equip our forces for nuclear war... this led to a requirement for physically smaller weapons and lower yield designs. The TOTEM and BUFFALO series showed that we had this capability, the yields of these six tests ranging from 1.5 KT to 15 KT.' (KT = kilotonnes). The last major trials at Maralinga were the ANTLER series in 1957, planned by Penney and directed by C.A. Adams, but there were further minor trials at Maralinga between 1956 and 1965.
The use of Maralinga had only been agreed after long and difficult negotiations with the Australian Government. At the outset Menzies and Howard Beale, his M in iste r for Supply, were ready to accede to British requests without asking too many questions, but by 1956 the Australians had become very sensitive over the use of their territory and were in sistin g on much greater participation and more stringent conditions. Similarly public o p in io n worldwide was increasingly demanding the end of nuclear testin g . T h is led to a n a g g in g worry that testing might end before the British H-Bomb could be developed. This put additional pressure on Aldermaston, and Penney was increasingly drawn into the political arena. In countering this mounting Australian concern, the greatest British asset was the personality and prestige of Penney. He went to great lengths to keep the Australians fully informed. In connexion with the BUFFALO series, he organized a major indoctrination programme for some 200 Australian officials and military personnel. So at the working level Anglo-Australian relations remained excellent. In an oft-quoted letter Lord Carrington, then UK High Commissioner in Canberra, wrote in May 1956:
Sir William Penney has established in Australia a reputation which is quite unique. . . His appearance, his obvious sincerity and honesty, and the general impression he gives that he would much rather be digging his garden -and would be but for the essential nature of his work -have made him a public figure of some magnitude in Australia.
At the end of the Anglo-Australian operation, the Australian Weapon Tests Safety Committee made a report to the Australian Government on the results of MOSAIC, BUFFALO and ANTLER in which they gave a complete safety clearance to all three series, stating categorically that there had been no risk to any person, livestock, or property in any of them. This was a high tribute to Penney who bore the direct responsibility for some of them and the indirect responsibility for them all.26 It was only much later that the conclusions in this Report were challenged by an Australian Royal Commission.27
After the M l resumption of Anglo-American co-operation in 1958, British testing took place in Nevada on a routine basis without any political or environmental complications, and Penney was no longer directly involved.
A n g l o -A m e r ic a n r el a t io n s 1945-58
The MacMahon Act 1946 involved a complete break in the exchange of information with the United States. Co-operation was resumed at a very low level with the Modus Vivendi negotiated in 1949, and gradually the flow of information was marginally improved by the process of declassification. However, co-operation at the intelligence level on the detection 3nd monitoring of fall-out from nuclear testing was never broken off, and it became much closer after the explosion of the first Soviet bomb in August 1949. Penney was involved in these contacts, and frequently visited the United States. He kept in close touch with his American friends and was able to sit up drinking with them half the night. There is little doubt that he and he alone gleaned in this way much information about the American programme.28 Further, though limited progress was made in June 1955 with the signature in W a s h in g to n of agreements for co-operation in the use of atomic energy, full collaboration was not resumed until the bilateral agreement of 195830 after Britain had achieved both atomic and thermonuclear status. When the wraps came off, it was revealed that while the Americans were far ahead in engineering, in research and development Aldermaston had kept abreast of the Americans and in some respects was ahead of them. So the final exchange was not all one way. This result was the ultimate testimony to Aldermaston's achievement under Penney's leadership, and close co-operation with the USA in weapons development was not afterwards interrupted.
In t e r n a t io n a l n e g o t ia t io n s
The United Nations 1946-1947
In 1945 Attlee and Truman agreed to the appointment of a UN Commission on the International Control of Atomic Energy. Truman appointed Bernard Baruch to lead the US delegation. He insisted on putting forward a proposal which no Soviet Government could ever accept. The Soviet Union countered with proposals which the USA, in turn, could never accept. However, the Commission laboured on from January 1946 into 1947 when it was disbanded without agreement. The British delegation was led by Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Sir James Chadwick, Sir George Thomson and Penney took turns in acting as his chief scientific adviser. Penney's only recorded comment on this assignment is 'We did some useful work and presented a report.'31 It was his first experience of an international conference. While in New York Penney suggested there should be experiments in the US and Canada to explore the possibilities of detecting and monitoring the effects of an atomic bomb test.32
Geneva 1958-59
In the period 1955-1958 the series of nuclear testing in the atmosphere by the USSR, the USA and the UK led to increasing national and international pressure for a ban on tests, and proposals and counter-proposals for a moratorium or a ban on testing were exchanged between the three countries, resulting in an agreement to convene a conference of experts, representing West and East, to study methods of detecting violations of a possible suspension of nuclear tests. This Conference was finally convened at Geneva on 1 July 1958. The Western side was led by the American scientist, James B. Fisk, and Penney led the British team. The conference rather quickly concluded that it was technically feasible to set up a workable and effective control system to detect violations. This technical breakthrough led in October 1958 to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests, which continued on and off until 1962, when it was adjourned sine die. Penney 
Bermuda and Moscow
With the arrival in 1961 of President Kennedy, a new initiative was taken by Harold Macmillan to revive the test ban negotiations. The Americans had been opposed to further negotiations, but President Kennedy was in favour, and the American policy began to change. The issue was discussed at the Bermuda Conference of December 1961 to which the Prime Minister took Penney as his principal adviser. He took a prominent part in the meeting. In Harold Macmillan's words 'Sir William Penney was a match for them all (i.e. the American nuclear experts). It was the first time the President had met this remarkable man... and he was deeply impressed by his humour and his sense of proportion as well as by his profound knowledge*.33 Later, a paper by Penney showing that even if the Russians cheated over underground testing, they would not be able to change the strategic balance, helped to modify American objections to a treaty. 35 Penney continued to be the principal British expert adviser; with Lord Zuckerman, throughout the discussions leading up to the signature of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in Moscow in July 1963. Harold Macmillan records again; 'Sir William Penney came to Cabinet and in a quarter of an hour gave a simple, but brilliant exposition of the problem.'35 Before the signature Penney and two American colleagues called on the Soviet delegate, Tsarapkin, to propose further meetings of scientific experts to discuss a comprehensive ban, but they were told that Kruschev saw no purpose in such a meeting. Penney was deeply disappointed at the failure to progress beyond a partial treaty.
The Atomic Energy Authority 1954-1960
In 1954, on the formation of the UK Atomic Energy Authority, Penney became Member for Weapons Development, while retaining executive responsibility for Aldermaston. Then, in July 1959, he succeeded Sir John Cockcroft as Member for Research with functional responsibility for research throughout the Authority and executive responsibility for Harwell, while keeping the functional responsibility for Weapons Development until Air Marshal Sir Claude Pelly succeeded him in 1960. Penney was appointed Deputy-Chairman in 1961, retaining his responsibility for Authority research.
The Windscale Accident, October 1957
When this accident (which, not unnaturally, caused a furore out of all proportion to its actual effects) occurred, Penney was the Authority member for weapons, the Antler series of tests in Australia were only just completed, the Christmas Island test of 8 November lay ahead and he was involved in negotiations at Geneva. Nevertheless in Cockcroft's absence in the USA, he was the only member available to take the chair of the Authority enquiry, in which he was assisted by Schonland, the Deputy Director of Harwell, Professor Kay from Imperial College and Professor Diamond from Manchester. The group, five in all, went up to Windscale and worked continuously for ten days. By all accounts Penney was a firm but sym p a th e tic C h a irm an. His report was balanced and factual, it congratulated the workforce on the way they had dealt with the accident, and it attached no blame to anyone. The report identified the prime cause of the fire and its probable source, a burst fuel element, but said that further investigation would be needed as the group had not had time to deal with all the evidence. After exhaustive study of 20 years this first report still stands up well, though it is now probable, though still not certain, that the original source of the fire lay in the graphite, and not in a fuel element. Similarly, the almost negligible effects on the health of the workforce and on the surrounding area and its population were correctly assessed in the report and have never been overturned by subsequent studies. Sir Frederick Brundrett, the Chief Scientific Adviser at the Ministry of Defence, wrote to Penney in glowing terms: 'My dear Billy, do allow me to congratulate you on the report. It seems to me to be a very fine effort.' However, the report was never published in full, though a summary was included in the first White Paper on the accident.36 In this document, part of the responsibility was attributed to bad judgement on the part of one or more individual members of the staff, a conclusion avoided by Penney, and this caused considerable subsequent grief. Three further enquiries followed under the Chairmanship of Sir Alexander Fleck, and Penney was a member of all three. They resulted in three further White Papers, on the Organization and control of Health and Safety in the AEA;37 on the technical evaluation of information relating to the design and operation of the Windscale Piles j and the factors in the controlled release of Wigner Energy.39 Penney remained a key figure in the subsequent follow up of the incident. It is believed that the celebration of its tercentenary was the first time that the Society made a general appeal for funds. Practically all the work in raising the finance was done by Penney himse lf in visiting and persuading companies and institutions to support the appeal, and his enthusiastic and persistent efforts ensured its success. The appeal was in the main used to pay for the Tercentenary costs, modernization of the central heating in the Burlington House apartments and the initial capital input for the staff pension scheme. Despite frequent overseas visits to Australia and to Washington, he proved to be a conscientious Treasurer (albeit very different from his predecessor who had required weekly estimates of coal stocks in the cellar) seeking financial statements and budgets on funds and accounts 'on a postcard', and indeed cutting out much superfluous detail in the published accounts. His informal -almost seemingly casual -manner did not, however, disguise a shrewd character always quick to get to the root of any problem and to suggest a practical solution.
According to a contemporary on the Council, 'Everyone admired the very solid approach of the "unflappable" Bill Penney in his capacity as Treasurer, and we all had confidence in the fact that the Society's finances were in Bill's capable hands. '40 In 1959, Penney also became the Royal Society's representative on the G o v e rn in g Body of Imperial College, and served until 1967. In the same year he was appointed to the Royal Society's seat on the Winchester College Governing Body and remained a Fellow until 1967. The headmaster highly valued his help on the science side, where he was instrumental in bringing about the development and upgrading of the Chemistry Department and the provision of a Projects Laboratory. Characteristically, he kept a low profile in the G o v e rn in g Body, but his sound advice and constructive ideas were much appreciated by the Fellows. And although he himself found the pace of d e c isio n -m a k in g in a rather conservative body frustratingly slow he evidently enjoyed the experiences. Interestingly e n o u g h , he is remembered for having on one occasion strongly defended the retention of c o m p u lso ry chapel against a proposal that this should become voluntary.41
T h e C h a ir o f t h e U KA EA [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] When Penney took over the Chair of the AEA from me in February 1964 he had already served as a Board member for nearly ten years. From 1954-59 he was pre-occupied with weapons development, but from 1959, and especially after he became Deputy Chairman in 1961, he was directly involved in all the main decisions and a major player in the tangled history of nuclear power, which is beyond the scope of this memoir.
In the early years, his was a voice of moderation in the clashes of personality and the often difficult relationship between the AEA and the CEGB. Then, as later, he tried to avoid confrontation and controversy and to work for consensus. In those early years too the AEA had been the dominant influence in the choice and development of the Magnox reactors; but in the selection of the second generation, the decisive voice was that of the CEGB and, of course, the Government, and the role of the UKAEA was increasingly an advisory one. Penney strongly endorsed the decision to select the AGR (1966), which was taken during his chairmanship. The decision to develop the Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor in addition to the AGR was taken shortly before he took over, but he was responsible for its successful development, and would have like to see more resources put into water reactors. Two other major decisions were taken in 1966, to proceed with a Prototype Fast Reactor at Dounreay, and to upgrade the Capenhurst separation plant. Throughout his chairmanship he showed a sound and steady judgement and prescience in both organizational and technical matters. He was in favour of a single construction company long before one was finally formed, and his technical assessment of the likely AGR performance was proved to be correct. If his advice had been followed, some of the subsequent grief might have been diminished.
Im p e r ia l C o l l e g e a g a in On his retirement as Chairman of the AEA in 1967 Penney readily accepted an invitation to become Rector of Imperial College. Although he had been the Royal Society representative on the Governing Body for six years, it seems that he had not fully appreciated how difficult and how much more onerous the post of Rector had become in the 15 years since he had been on the staff. Nor had he foreseen that there would be no opportunity to pursue his own research interests. He arrived in the middle of the quinquennium in which the second phase of the College's post-war expansion took place. The College had already won the right of direct access to the UGC for capital funds, and was no longer dependent in that respect on the University of London. But finance was already becoming tight. The 1960s were difficult years for British universities. The expansion had been too rapid, not only in fin a n c ia l but in human terms. It was a period of staff agitation and student unrest. Imperial College did not escape these problems, but thanks to Penney's sound judgement and skilful handling of staff and students, he avoided the bad feeling and confrontations j which occurred elsewhere.
On taking over, Penney found the faculties and main departments under the leadership of strong personalities with decided views; a branch of the AUT led by a rather difficult character; an assertive branch of the NALGO Trade Union; and a student body agitating for greater participation in decision-making. He also inherited a bruising negotiation with the Architectural Association on the terms of a prospective merger with the College. Penney faced these challenges with patience, equanimity, good humour, shrewdness and common sense. He was also easy of access to staff and students and sympathetic to student aspirations, but remained firm on essentials. He devised special machinery for the discussion of current problems! a Committee of Deans; a Joint Committee, under his chairmanship, of the Governing Body, staff and students to talk about student aspirations; and finally an Academic Assembly with wide membership. The process was painful at times, but ended in general consensus. The Governing Body agreed to student observers, and Penney brought them on to the Board of Studies. A modus vivendi was eventually agreed with the AUT. After some ups and downs the student body was generally satisfied with the concessions they had won, and in the end relations with the Union, under a talented President, were very good. The Architectural Association was finally informed that the conditions for a merger did not exist. The second stage of the College expansion was successfully completed, and financially the quinquennium ended with the College in the black.
In this period, too, a time-consuming, laborious and rather unsuccessful appeal was held, which at least allowed for an improvement in student accommodation. Yet another time-consuming operation was the opposition to and final shelving of the Murray report on the governance of London University. Bill Penney resigned as Rector in September 1973 to 'complete his scientific work and to pursue other interests'. As Chairman, I was able to tell the Governing Body that
We had viewed his appointment with the highest expectations and they had all been fulfilled. He had agreed to serve for five years and had remained for six. He had kept the show on the road at an even pace and had maintained its equilibrium in a remarkable manner. This was mainly due to the general confidence in his good judgment backed with patience and good humour. He had handled everyone with wisdom.
For all his openness and approachability, Penney kept his thoughts and feelings very much to himself, but a letter of condolence in 1986 to the widow of Professor Harry Jones, the mathematician, contains the following passage:
These were difficult times, and... I asked Harry to be Pro-Rector. . . The students were sometimes uncontrollable, the heads of departments were bewildered and angry, the rest of the staff, including the technicians, wanted a say in how everything was run. Harry had the respect of everyone.
Here, perhaps, is a clue to his decision to retire from the Rectorship at the early age of 63. He never came again after 1973. This was a great pity as he had so much to contribute to the scientific work. But the political arena was not for him, even though politics hardly entered into the work of the scientific and technological c o m m ittees. His decision to abstain reflects the essentially retiring and withdrawn side to his character. R e t ir e m e n t During his Rectorship of Imperial College Penney had taken on some positions in industry. He was appointed a non-executive director of Tube Investments, and of Standard Telephones and Cables (UK) where he supervised the laboratories. He had b o u g h t a house at East Hendred in Berkshire and retained a small office at Aldermaston, where he resumed his research, mainly into blast effects. After leaving his industrial positions he led an increasingly quiet life. He took litde part in local affairs, though he was President of the Sports Club and a trustee of the village hall. He played golf and fished -he was a skilful fisherman, and an influential member of the Piscatorial Society, but, characteristically, he preferred to fish by himself. He was also an aggressive and vigorous gardener, concentrating on vegetables rather than flowers. In 1983 he entered into correspondence with the American members of a joint US-Japanese Committee set up to re-assess the yield and blast effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs for the purpose of dealing with claims for compensation for injury. This correspondence included the remarkable paper referred to by Professor Stuart, and which appears to be his only surviving unpublished scientific work. Then in 1985, the Australian Government (under Hawke) set up a Royal Commission on the British Nuclear Teste in Australia. By this time, the Australian political attitude to testing had moved through 90° from full co-operation to outright hostility. The Commission, though in form judicial, was politically motivated and out to blackguard the anglophile Menzies government. This political and anti-British bias is clearly brought out in die report's introduction which contains unrestrained censure of Menzies and Howard Beale, criticism of Penney, and probably libellous comment on Professor Titterton. The Commission came to England to take evidence and Penney was the principal witness, without much support. He was rudely and roughly handled by the Commission, and was deeply wounded and depressed by the experience and by the Commission's conclusions. It is the u n a n im o u s view of his family and friends that he never fully recovered from the treatment he received at the Commission's hands. It certainly saddened his later years. In January 1991 a fatal cancer was unexpectedly diagnosed and death came within a few weeks.
Re t r o s p e c t
Looking back on Penney's career, it is evident that he succeeded in everything that he undertook. Throughout his long involvement in the development of nuclear weapons, he met all the deadlines and never had a failure. The UKAEA performed well during his Chairmanship, and he was an outstanding Rector of Imperial College even if he himself found the position something of a burden. What was the secret of this success? He began, of course, with a first class scientific intelligence, combined with an equable temperament and practical common sense. He had his feet firmly planted on the ground, and unlike some of his colleagues, good political judgement. He was transparently honest, straightforward and dedicated. He believed in what he was doing and was convinced that the development of a nuclear capability was the surest way to prevent major conflicts. He did not suffer from the guilt complex which subsequently affected many of the nuclear scientists. He was a good leader of men, and inspired loyalty and affection in his subordinates. He got on well with people in general, notably with the armed services, with the Americans, and with the Australians. He was completely without pretence. He was happy in his family life and content with the company of Joan and his two sons and their children.
In appearance, he was a rotund, rather owl-like figure, usually casually dressed. He was friendly and amiable, if sometimes rather withdrawn in company, often with an amused smile, for he had a keen sense of humour. One of his hostesses44 said that he was a delightful A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s Due to Penney's decision to bum his papers there is an almost total lack of original material other than his scientific publications. I have been obliged to rely largely on secondary sources and on anecdotal evidence. 
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